Inna Golod v. Bank of Amer Corp by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-13-2010 
Inna Golod v. Bank of Amer Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Inna Golod v. Bank of Amer Corp" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 116. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/116 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                                                      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






INNA GOLOD,  
 




BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION;  
BANK OF AMERICA TECHNOLOGY AND OPERATIONS, INC.;  
MBNA TECHNOLOGY, INC. 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware  
(D. C. No. 1-08-cv-00746) 
District Judge:  Hon. Noel L. Hillman  
      
 
Argued on November 3, 2010 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed December 13, 2010) 
 
 
Gary W. Aber, Esquire (Argued) 
Aber, Goldlust, Baker & Over 
704 King Street, Suite 600 
P. O. Box 1675 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
 





Elena Marcuss, Esquire (Argued) 
McGuire Woods LLP 
7 St. Paul Street, Suite 1000 
Baltimore, MD   21202 
Bruce M. Steen, Esquire 
McGuire Woods LLP 
Bank of America Corporate Center 
100 North Tryon Street, Suite 2900 
Charlotte, NC   28202 
 
   Counsel for Appellees 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Inna Golod appeals the order of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware granting defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss and denying her Motion to Amend.   
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We review the District Court‟s decision to grant defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss 
under a plenary standard.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  
The District Court‟s decision not to grant Golod‟s Motion to Amend is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I.  Background and Procedural History 
 Golod filed a complaint against Bank of America Corporation, Bank of America 
Technology and Operations, Inc., and MBNA Technology, Inc. (collectively Bank of 
America) on October 2, 2008.  Golod‟s complaint asserts six causes of action:  (1) 
discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin, and religion pursuant to Title VII of 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Title VII); (2) racial and 
national origin discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (§ 1981);  (3) retaliation 
pursuant to Title VII;  (4) retaliation pursuant to § 1981;  (5) defamation;  and (6) 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 Golod filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Delaware Department of Labor 
(DDOL) and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on March 12, 2007, 
alleging that she was discriminated against based on her sex and national origin.  The 
DDOL concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe Golod had been 
discriminated or retaliated against.  The EEOC adopted the findings of the DDOL and 
issued a dismissal and Notice of Rights. 
The gist of Golod‟s allegations is as follows:  Golod, a Russian-born woman, who 
is a naturalized American citizen of Jewish ancestry and religion with 23 years of 
software engineering experience, began working for Bank of America in May 1996 as a 
Technology Leader for new technology projects.  She is a well-educated, experienced 
professional.  She claims that, despite consistently receiving high marks for performance, 
she was repeatedly denied promotion requests, relegated to positions she considered 
beneath her, denied various educational opportunities, and forced to work in professional 
isolation.  Other employees secured promotions and educational opportunities that Golod 
sought but did not obtain.  The complaint does not aver that the other employees were not 
members of her asserted protected classes; rather, it alleges only that individuals with less 
experience were promoted over her.  She contends that her complaints to management 





  On November 17 2006, Bank of America notified Golod that she was being 
terminated.   
On October 27, 2008, Bank of America moved to dismiss Golod‟s complaint.  The 
District Court granted the motion on all counts, holding that Golod‟s allegations of 
discrimination and retaliation were broad, conclusory and failed to allege the elements of 
a Title VII or § 1981 claim.  Golod v. Bank of Am. Corp., Civil No. 08-746, 2009 WL 
1605309 (D. Del. June 4, 2009).  Specifically, the District Court found that Golod failed 
to allege that nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably.  Id. at *3.  
The District Court also noted that Golod‟s allegations do not detail what protected 
conduct she engaged in, what promotions she was denied, or which Bank of America 
employee or employees denied her promotion and educational requests.  Id. 
While the District Court was considering the motion to dismiss, Golod filed a 
Motion to Amend her Complaint and attached a Proposed Amended Complaint.  The 
Proposed Amended Complaint did not attempt to amend Golod‟s discrimination and 
retaliation claims; it only sought to amend her defamation claims.  The District Court 
found that Golod‟s proposed amendments would be futile for the purpose of amending 
her discrimination and retaliation claims because her failure to “propose amendments to 
those counts in light of defendants‟ pointed and clear challenges to them is evidence that 
                                                 
1
  Golod asserted for the first time in a footnote of her Reply Brief that the EEOC 
charge “states that not only was Mrs. Golod the subject of discrimination, but also „. . . all 
Russian born female workers based on their national origin complained of their treatment 
. . . .”  (See Appellant Reply Br. at 19 n.3.)  We decline to consider arguments raised on 
appeal for the first time in a reply brief.  Laborers’ Int’l. Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. 
Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994). 
5 
 
she has no such facts to plead.”  Id. at *4 n.5.  Golod appealed.  
II.  Analysis 
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true 
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 
347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), require a plaintiff to set forth “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 500 U.S. at 570).  “Threadbare recitals of 
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
suffice . . . .”  Id. at 1949.  In other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of 
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  Id.  
A court must engage in a two-step analysis to ensure compliance with the Iqbal 
pleading standard:  (1) a court must ignore legal conclusions and (2) consider only those 
allegations entitled to a presumption of truth to determine whether “they plausibly give 
rise to an entitlement to relief.”  Id. at 1950; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 
F.3d 203, 210-12 (3d Cir. 2009).   
A.  Golod’s Discrimination Claims 
We first consider whether the District Court properly dismissed Golod‟s 
discrimination and retaliation claims.  In order to overcome a motion to dismiss these 
claims, Golod has the burden of pleading sufficient factual matter that permits the 
reasonable inference that Golod was terminated or retaliated against because of her race, 
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sex, and/or national origin.  See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 
318-19 (3d Cir. 2000).  Golod has not met her burden.  Rather, her allegations are “naked 
assertions „devoid of further factual enhancement.‟”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).   
With respect to her discrimination claims, Golod offered no factual allegations to 
bolster her legal conclusions.  For example, she did not provide any characteristics of 
those individuals who received the promotions to which she alleges she was entitled.  She 
did not provide any factual allegations regarding those promotions, who rejected her 
promotion requests and whether she was, in fact, qualified to fill those positions.  Instead, 
she conclusorily asserted that she was denied promotions and educational opportunities.  
The District Court could not, nor can we, infer from these allegations that the denial of 
these requests and opportunities was because of her Russian and/or Jewish heritage.
2
  
Thus, because she has failed to allege any causal connection between her Russian and/or 
Jewish heritage and Bank of America‟s decision to terminate her position, we will affirm 
the District Court‟s dismissal of her discrimination claims. 
 
 
                                                 
2
  Like the District Court, we focus on the absence of adequate comparator evidence 
because this appears to be the most obvious way to supplement Golod‟s deficient 
complaint.  But Golod was not required to plead comparator evidence to support an 
inference of discrimination.  Such an inference could be supported in a number of ways, 
including, but not limited to, comparator evidence, evidence of similar racial 
discrimination of other employees, or direct evidence of discrimination from statements 
or actions by her supervisors suggesting racial animus.  See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 
534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002). 
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B.  Golod’s Retaliation Claims 
Golod‟s retaliation claims suffer from similar fatal shortcomings.  She does not 
provide any factual matter to support her conclusory allegations of retaliation, and thus 
she failed to move these claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”  Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. at 1951 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  After correctly disregarding 
Golod‟s legal conclusions, the District Court was left with insufficient “factual content 
that [would allow] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 556-57).  
C.  Golod’s Request for Amendment 
 We next consider whether we should remand this case to the District Court so that 
Golod may amend her discrimination and retaliation claims.  Golod argues that the 
District Court‟s order closing the case simultaneously with the issuance of its opinion 
precluded her from amending her original complaint or seeking another form of relief 
short of appealing to this Court.
3
  We agree with the District Court that Golod is not 
entitled to another opportunity to amend her complaint.   
Rule 15(a) grants Golod one amendment as a matter of right for 21 days after 
Bank of America filed its Motion to Dismiss.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Fletcher-
Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Golod did, in fact, exercise her 15(a) right to amend her complaint but failed to add any 
allegations to her discrimination and retaliation claims.  Despite several opportunities to 
                                                 
3  The administrative “closing” of the case did not of course prevent Golod from 
moving to amend the complaint or from filing a motion for reconsideration.  See 
Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pate, 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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do so, Golod has failed to articulate throughout the proceedings before the District Court 
and this Court the substance of any proffered amendments to her discrimination and 
retaliation claims  Thus, there is no reason to believe that, on remand, she can make 
averments sufficient to nudge her claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.  
The District Court correctly determined that further amendment would be futile.  See 
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
